

# THE PAKHTUN QUESTION



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# THE PAKHTUN QUESTION

The Pakhtuns have always been a very important factor in Central Asian politics, although it is only in the light of recent events that the attention of the peoples of the Western World has been in some degree directed towards them, and it is the aim of this booklet to present the events which have given rise to the present dispute between Pakistan and Pakhtunistan in perspective against the historical background, a knowledge of which is of vital importance to the proper understanding of the situation as it is to-day, and the reasons for which Afghanistan supports the cause of the Pakhtuns of Pakhtunistan.

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As will be seen the dispute between the Pakhtuns and the Pakistan Government is a matter of vital interest to Afghanistan in regard to her own relations with Pakistan, since, long before the partition of India, this matter was under continuous discussion with Great Britain.

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# PAKHTUNISTAN

Pakhtunistan is the name of the country lying between the Afghan border and the natural and historical border of the Indian sub-continent, the River Indus — to-day the eastern frontier of Pakistan. It extends from Chitral in the north, where its frontier borders on Kashmir, to Baluchistan in the south, and has a population of over 7,000,000 in an area of over 190,000 square miles.

“ Pakhtunistan ” or “ Pashtunistan ”, means “ the land of the Pakhtuns (Pashtuns) ”. The Indian form “ Pathanistan ” is derived from their pronunciation of the word “ Pakhtun ” as “ Pathan ”.

The name “ Pakhtun ” is related historically to “ Bakhti ” or “ Bakhdi ”, the ancient Bactria or Balkh of to-day, which is situated in the Province of Mazar, north of Kabul, capital of Afghanistan. It was from Bactria that, during the period of the early Aryan migrations, the Pakhtuns moved to the regions which they now inhabit along the Sulaiman range of mountains, and the western, eastern and southern provinces of Afghanistan.

Those who settled in the Southern Province of Afghanistan called their land “ Paktia ”, a name mentioned in the ancient historical document of *Avesta* which graphically describes the mountainous nature of the region and the warlike cavaliers who inhabited it. Paktia, according to *Avesta*, was one of the provinces of the country known as Ariana, the definition of whose borders coincides with those of present-day Afghanistan. The *Rigveda* also contains a reference to the Pakhtuns under the name “ Pak-ht ”, and to their land as “ Paktica ”, and Herodotus, the Greek historian, mentions the “ Paktyes ”, or “ the inhabitants of Paktya ”.

Known throughout the ancient history of Central Asia as one of the most powerful and warlike communities of the Ayran race, the Pakhtuns succeeded in inhabiting the fertile western bank of the Indus River.

The Pakhtuns may be divided into two main clans, the Ghilzais and the Durranis, each of which is sub-divided into smaller clans. The most important clans of Pakhtunistan are Ghilzais, though two of the largest, the Mohmands and the Shoranis, do belong to the Durranis. The other principal clans are the Afridis, the Wazirs (divided into Darwaish Khail and Mahsuds), and the Yusufzais. Of these, the Afridis inhabit the area of Tirah and the Khyber Pass; the land of the Wazirs is known as Waziristan, the tract lying between Kurram and the Gomal Passes of Afghanistan; and most of the Yusufzais live in Swat. The Mohmands dwell in Buer, Dir and Bajaur, and the Shoranis in the valleys near Takt Sulaiman. Between Tirah and Miranzai live the Orakzais, and the Khataks inhabit both banks of the Indus River. Other important clans are the Chambanis and the Zaimukhts.

In the words of General Sir George MacMunn, the whole Pakhtun trans-frontier is one inseparable unit: "Mahsud links up with Wazir; Wazir with Zaimukht; Zaimukht with Orakzai; Orakzai with Afridi; Afridi with Mohmand; Mohmand with the tribes of Bajaur; Bajaur with Dir; Dir with Swat; Swat with Buner; Buner with the Indus Valley; and the Indus Valley with the Black mountain".

The most important districts, valleys and passes are as follows:

**CHITRAL.**—The capital of Chitral, situated 47 miles from the main watershed of the Hindu Kush range, is called by the same name as the state. It derives its importance from its location at the northern extremity of Pakhtunistan, one hundred miles from the Peshawar frontier at Malakand, but accessible only through the independent territories of Swat and Bajaur over the Lowardi or by the more circuitous route from Gilgit in Kashmir through the Shandur pass.

**HAZARA** is surrounded by the Black Mountain, Swat, Kohistan and Chilas in the north, by Kashmir in the east, Rawalpindi in the south, and by the Indus River along its western boundary. It



forms a part of the Peshawar district and consists of a long narrow valley shut in by mountains which cuts through the heart of the outer Himalayas. The northern ranges are snow-capped throughout the year, but the central mountains are thickly forested and fertile, with every available slope under cultivation. The valley is rendered fertile by the numerous tributaries of the Indus and the Kunhar River with its many rivulets which flow through the Kagan valley.

Chief among the Pakhtun clans are the Indus Swatis, the Hassanzais, Akazais, Chagarzais, Madda Khels, Amazais and 'Umarzais.

KOHISTAN is the name given to the district between the Kagan valley and the Indus, south and west of Chilas. Situated on the Peshawar border, it consists largely of two main valleys running east and west and divided by a range of mountains. The lower hills are covered with fine timber and grass and the valleys, especially the basin near the Indus, are fertile and well cultivated.

SWAT takes its name from the river which rises in Kohistan not far from the Gilgit River and whose waters are carried by a network of canals to irrigate some 160,000 acres. It is a tract on the Peshawar border on the direct road to Chitral, and accessible from the south by way of the Malakand, the Shahkot and other mountain passes.

The valley is quite densely populated, though narrow, and serviced only by arduous mountain paths and tracks. The Swatis are a branch of the Yusufzai clan of Pakhtuns.

MALAKAND PASS connects the Peshawar district with the valley of Swat. It has achieved military significance since the occasion in 1895 during the Chitral campaign when Sir Robert Low's advance was halted there by 7,000 Pakhtuns. In the course of the frontier risings two years later, the Swatis attacked the fortress, which had been constructed in the intervening period to guard the road to Chitral, as well as the adjacent post at Chakdara. Heavy casualties were inflicted, causing a military force to be sent which remained throughout the frontier operations of 1897 - 98.

DIR, which commands much of the main Chitral - Peshawar road, is situated north-east of Swat. Recognized as an independent state during the British rule, the conflict at one time between the Khans of Dir and the neighbouring state of Jandol constituted one of the principal causes of the Chitral campaign of 1895.

BUNER is a narrow mountain valley on the Peshawar border. It is divided into seven sub-divisions peopled by the powerful and war-like Niaszai and Milizai branches of the Yusufzais, from whose territory they are separated by the Sinawar range of mountains.

PESHAWAR is the largest district of Pakhtunistan. It is entirely surrounded by mountains inhabited by the Mohmand, Utman Khel and Afridi tribes and the inhabitants of the district itself are also Pakhtuns.

The city commands a position of great strategic importance, only 11 miles from Jamrud at the entrance to the Khyber Pass, near the left bank of the River Bara. It has been for centuries an important marketing centre for horses, raw wool and woollen cloth, silks, dyes, gold thread, carpets, postins (sheepskin clothing) and fruit. These goods are brought in caravans from Kabul by Afghan merchants.

TIRAH lies on the Peshawar border between the Khyber Pass and the Khanki valley. It is a mountainous tract cut by the valleys round the source of the Bara River. The five chief valleys are the Maidan, Rajgul, Waran, Bara and Mastura, and the main passes are the Sampagha, Arhanga, Saran Sar, Tseri Kandao and the Sapri. History best remembers the district, which is inhabited by the Pakhtun clans of Afridi and Orakzai, as the scene of the Tirah Campaign of 1897.

KHYBER PASS is famous throughout history as the most vital of the passes leading to India from Afghanistan. "No other pass in the world has possessed such strategic importance or retains so many historic associations as this gateway to the plains of India."

The pass is a narrow gorge winding up to the more lofty mountains towards Afghanistan. Almost immediately west of Peshawar lies the great central range of Speen Ghar which follows the same parallel of latitude from the meridian of Kabul to within ten miles of Peshawar.

Passing the fort of Jamrud, the Khyber proper begins at Shadi Bagar. After the Loargi part which ends at Landi Kotal, the great Kabul highway runs between low hills down to the Kabul River and thence to Dakka. The beginnings of this road were made during the second Anglo-Afghan war.

BAJAUR is a small district lying at a high altitude to the east of the Kunan valley. It is cut off from this valley by an unbroken line of craggy frontier hills over which ran the old road from Kabul to India before the Khyber became the principal route. Bajaur is peopled by Pakhtuns, almost exclusively members of the Tarkani clan, sub-divided into Mamunds, Isazais and Ismailzais. The mountain district of the Mohmands borders on the south, with the Swatis, another Pakhtun race, dwelling in the hills on the east. It is connected by the new road from Malakand and the Punjab to Chitral.

KOHAT lies east of the Indus. The frontier mountains are a continuation of the Speen Ghar range, with the Khatak ranges in the east and the Waziri hills on the south between Kohat and Bannu. In a low line of these hills, composed entirely of solid rock-salt, "which may probably rank as one of the largest veins of its kind in the world, are the numerous salt mines. Sulphur is found in the northern range and petroleum wells up from a rock 23 miles east of Kohat". The fertile Miranzai forms the extreme west.

KOHAT PASS, which varies from 400 yards to  $1\frac{1}{4}$  miles in width, provides an alternative route to Peshawar without crossing the Indus. Here dwell the Adam Khel Afridis.

BANNU lies north of the Indus with a valley forming an irregular oval which stretches to the foot of the frontier hills. Bannu, the principal city, is situated in the north-west corner in the valley of the Kurram River, which flows into the Indus.

The population of this district is entirely Pakhtun. The Marwats, known as Bannuchis, or "belonging to Bannu", inhabit the lower sandy regions of the main valley, with the Waziris, recent immigrants from the hills, cultivating the fertile lands near the border where dwell also the Battani and some Durrani clans. A railway runs from Kalabagh to Bannu, with a branch line through



the Pezu Pass to Tank, and motor roads connect the town with Dera Ismail Khan, the Tochi valley and Razmak in Waziristan. No bridge crosses the Indus within the district but the river is navigable for native boats throughout its course.

DERA GHAZI KHAN consists of a narrow tract of land which runs from the western frontier hills of the district down to the Indus in the east.

DERA ISMAIL KHAN — East of the Indus, it is inhabited by nomadic tribes and barely cultivated, the lower land being exposed to river action. The old town was swept away by floods in 1823 and the main channel of the Indus often changes. It is a market centre for traders from Afghanistan. It is in this district that the Pakhtun and Baluch tribes converge, though the Pakhtun element predominates. On the frontier dwell the Shoranis, Ustaranis and Bhittanis clans.

WAZIRISTAN is a most important tract and is considered the fortress of independence in Pakhtunistan.

The Tochi and Gomal rivers enclose the central dominating range of Waziristan from north-east to south-west, geologically connected with the great limestone ranges of the Sulaiman hills to the south. To the west lie the grass slopes and cedar woods of Birmal and Shawal, and the ridges of the central watershed which shuts off the plains of Ghazni. To the east several lines of drainage strike away from the Indus. Two of these lead to Razmak and Makin; a third to Kaniguram at the foot of the Pirghal mountain and the centre of a considerable iron trade.

The Waziris are divided into two main sub-clans, the Darwesh Khel, referred to as "Wazirs", and Mahsuds. The Darwesh Khel inhabit the lower hills bordering on Kohat and Bannu and both sides of the Kurram River, between Thal on the north and the Tochi valley on the south. The Mahsud country is more difficult even than Tirah.

The years 1852, 1859, 1860, 1880, 1881, 1894, 1897 and 1902 mark the number of British expeditions.

GOMAL, between the Khyber and the Bolan, is one of the most important passes. It was opened in 1889 when the British

Government attempted to bring the Zhob valley, like the Bari valley, under British protection.

WANA is an important valley lying west of the Mahsud country and north of the Gomal River. It occupies a vital strategic position on the Afghan border. When the Indo-Afghan boundary commission was delimiting the Waziri border, the Mahsud Waziris, thinking their independence to be threatened, attacked the camp of the commission at Wana. The result was the Waziristan Expedition of the same year, and the occupation of Wana by British troops. It was abandoned during the third Anglo-Afghan war.

TOCHI VALLEY, or Dawar, is one of the chief routes into Afghanistan. It is inhabited by the Dawari Pakhtuns. The valley is divided into two parts, known as Upper and Lower Dawar, by a narrow pass called the Taghrai Tangi, some three miles long. It was by this route that Mahmud of Ghazni effected several of his attacks on India, and the remains of a road flanking the valley and of defensive positions are still to be traced. After the Waziristan Expedition of 1894 the Tochi were garrisoned by British troops; but when Lord Curzon reorganized the frontier in 1901, the British troops were withdrawn, and their place supplied by tribal militia. The chief posts are Saidgi, Idak, Miranshah, Datta Khel and Sheranni. The valley was the scene of action for the Tochi or Dawari Expeditions in 1872 and 1897.

BALUCHISTAN extends from the Gomal River to the Arabian sea, and from the borders of Persia and Afghanistan to those of Punjab and Sind. During the British rule it comprised two main divisions: areas directly administered and the tribal areas.

To the north, hedged in between Afghanistan and the plains of the Indus, stretch the long ridges of rough highlands which embrace the Sulaiman system.

From Dobandi, at the junction of the Gomal and Kundar, the boundary on the side of Afghanistan follows the Kundar stream to the south-west and then diverges northwards, returning to the hills south of Chaman, and is thence-forward defined by hill ranges southwards to Nushki. The eastern boundary of this northern section of Baluchistan is the "red line" at the foot of the frontier hills. During the British rule all this northern section was known

as independent Baluchistan and was in the hands of the Shoranis — a Pakhtun clan. The southern end of the Sulaiman system is occupied by Baluchis. Amongst the Pakhtuns, the Kakars and Dumars of Pishin, with the Mando Khel of Zhob, are the most prominent clan divisions.

The curved recession of the Solaiman ranges to the north-west leaves a flat alluvial desert to the south. The point of this inlet receives the drainage of two local basins, the Bolan and Nari. Beyond it, north and south, lies independent Baluchistan.

The square block of Southern Baluchistan drains south and west, either to the Arabian sea or to the central swamps of Lora and Mashkel. The Hab river, which forms the boundary west of Karachi; the Purali (the ancient Arabus), draining the low-lying flats of Las Bela; the Hingol (the ancient Tomerus) and the Desert in Makran, are all considerable streams, draining into the Arabian sea and forming important arteries in the network of internal communications. The fortress of Kalat is situated between the sources of the Bolan and Mula, near a small tributary of the Lora on the western edge of a cultivated plain. To the north are the Sarawan ridges, enclosing narrow fertile valleys. Some streams drain southern Lora which drains also the Pishin valley. To the west lies the Kharan desert, with intermittent river channels often lost in the sand-waves. The eastern frontier of south Baluchistan over against the desert of Sind follows the foot of the Kirthar range, whose limestone walls rise for thousands of feet.

The boundary between Baluchistan and Afganistan runs westwards from near Nushki across the Lora Hamun to the Chagai Hills: the route to Seistan from Nushki thus runs south of these hills.

The chief languages spoken are vernaculars of Baluchistan, Pakhtu and Baluchi. The Baluchi language belongs to the Iranian branch of the Aryan sub-family of the Indo-European family and thus belongs to the same group as Pakhtu. There are thirteen clans of Pakhtun origin of which the Kakars are the most important. They are to be found in the largest numbers in Zhob, Quetta, Pishin, and Thal-Chotiali, Kalat and Chagai. The Baluchs are considered to be of Afghan origin.

The valley of Zhob lies in the north-east. It is a large valley running eastward and then northward parallel to the Indus frontier; till it meets the Gomal river at Khajuri Kach, forming the shortest route to Quetta.

The Bolan Pass is an important pass on the Baluch frontier, connecting Jacobabad and Sibi with Quetta. The Harnai valley to the north-east of Sibi provides another route to Quetta.





# PAKHTUNISTAN MISUNDERSTOOD

There is a very considerable misunderstanding of the Pakhtuns and the nature of this land, Pakhtunistan, which is largely due to the misrepresentation which it has suffered at the hands of those writers who have concerned themselves with it. Those writings which exist are mainly concerned with the more barren and hilly regions, popularly known as the tribal area, since it is the inhabitants of these regions who have formed the main topic of discussion when the frontier problems of the British Government of India came under review by these same writers, who have in the main relied, in default of actual experience of the country and its people, on the views of the colonist Government Officials, Military or otherwise, whose work has been connected with this region.

This is, in fact, the major cause of the misrepresentation mentioned above, since the statements of the military writers themselves are necessarily circumscribed by the military viewpoint to which their interest was for the most part limited; they were also necessarily restricted by the fact that they were mostly confined to their military posts and the immediate activities of these posts, and never, owing to the continuous state of tension which existed on the border, had the opportunity of moving freely about the country or of associating with the people, whom they were obliged to regard in the light of "an enemy".

This state of affairs, in conjunction with its comparative geographical isolation and lack of communications, has in turn precluded foreign observers from that contact with local sources of information which would have given them a real grasp of the state of affairs in the country itself regarded as a whole, and not with

the attention mainly concentrated on that part of the land which can be described as mountainous and barren.

It is forgotten by, if not indeed unknown to, these writers and journalists, that there exist, over the country as a whole, fertile valleys, the agricultural yield of which, properly husbanded, can balance the deficiencies of the bleaker parts of the land, and that even in the so called barren hills mineral resources exist which, when fully developed, may render these regions even richer than those more fertile regions which will supply them with their subsistence. The fact that, for the reasons already given, a reliable survey of the country has never been taken, and that no authority in the field of economy has been able to report on the economic potentialities of this little known land, has led to the statements of these narrowly informed writers being accepted as a more or less complete representation of Pakhunistan, to which must be added a third factor which is rooted in political theory and practice.

It has been the Imperialist policy in all continents to find an excuse for depriving certain peoples of their right to independence by representing them as a backward people, and to ignore any recorded evidence which exists of an older cultural background than any to which the Imperialist power can itself lay claim, and to this end the Pakhtuns were presented to the outside world as an almost entirely uncivilised people living in one of the wildest parts of the world. Most of the writers to whom reference has been made were connected with the Government service and thus naturally followed the lines of the policy of that Government, but there are amongst them those who have personally apprehended the responsibility borne by certain of their compatriots for the injustice of which these people are the victims. Mr. B. Scott, author of "Afghan and Pathan" has the following passage "Now as to the character of the Afghan and Pathan, in the accounts of his wars and fighting on all our frontiers, one often reads of his fanaticism, his reckless bravery and cruelty, as well . . . as to fanaticism well, if we in England found a foreign army, for no reason that we knew of, invading our country and blowing up our homes and public buildings, etc., I fancy we would do our best to wipe them out, and call ourselves patriots, not fanatics." Mr. Scott adds "The first invasion of Afghanistan by our troops was considered by the tribes

as unprovoked and deeply resented. Before that, "English and other European travellers often wandered freely across Afghanistan, even into Central Asia," which contradicts the impression created by writers dealing with a somewhat later period of history that the people who defended their liberties against the inhuman acts of aggression to which they were from time to time subjected, were regarded by those who sought to deprive them of their liberties as savages.

From the historical viewpoint Imperialist policy produced a mistrust in the Pakhtuns, the unfortunate consequence of which was the enmity which resulted between the Pakhtuns and the British, which closed the door to friendship between these two peoples for many decades: when one compares the memoirs of the writers of the 18th Century with the work of British writers in later periods one is forced to place the responsibility of this state of affairs on the shoulders of the policy makers of the Imperialist Government. Mr. Warburton author of "Eighteen Years in the Khyber" wrote in 1900 "It is necessary to say a few parting words of the people, with whom I have lived and been associated continuously for so many years . . . and what manner of men are these, who inhabit the historical entrance to the plains of India. If you can overcome their mistrust and be kind to him (the Pakhtun) in words, he will repay you by great devotion, and he will put up with any punishment you like to give him, except abuse. It took me years to get through this thick crust of mistrust, but what was the after result? For upwards of 15 years I went about unarmed among these people; my camp, wherever it happened to be pitched, was always guarded and protected by them."

This policy of misrepresentation so closely pursued by all these writers, was the only way in which the bombardment of the homes and the attempts to suppress the will to freedom of these people, could be excused, the implication being that these hungry people living in such barren conditions would be led by starvation to launch attacks on the rich plains of India. It was in fact the repressive policy so rigorously pursued in the border districts that hindered the development and building up of the country by its people, who were wholly occupied in preserving their independence. For a period of over 150 years not a hospital was built in this area

nor a single school opened and, since the departure of the British from India, the Government of Pakistan has by its aggressive policy towards these people, given them no chance to think of any other necessity of life save their own self-preservation and the defence of their independence.

From the economic point of view we find that Pakhtunistan is bound on the west by the river Indus the banks of which river, from the borders of Kashmir down to the Arabian Sea, have always been considered one of the most fertile regions of the world. It was the fertility of this region which attracted the great Aryan race when, thousand of years before Christ, the ancient Aryans migrated from the vicinity of the river Oxus through Afghanistan, where the centre of population was to be found in that district called Balkh (known in ancient times as Bactria), which migration halted on the banks of the Indus, which is the natural boundary between Central Asia and the sub-continent of India. It is from the name Indus, given to this river by these people that the word "Hind", meaning India, derives. Some parts of this country so long inhabited by the Pakhtuns, such as the valley of Peshawar, are considered to be amongst the most fertile tracks of the continent of Asia. The rich soil and the climate of this land, lying between the high mountains of Afghanistan and the vast plains of India, favour the growth not only of a great variety of both tropical and non-tropical plants but it has the added advantage — not shared by neighbouring countries — of being suitable for the cultivation of plants that grow in a cold climate.

Another advantage enjoyed by Pakhtunistan is that it does not suffer, unlike India and Pakistan, from over population and may therefore not only become, with due cultivation, a self sufficient country in so far as food is concerned but may even produce a surplus which could be exported to those neighbouring countries where famine is not infrequent. The people, of a different race from Indians and Pakistanis, and nurtured in better geographical conditions, are both hardy and hard working, which augurs well for the future development of the land.

But apart from her natural agricultural resources Pakhtunistan, it must be emphasized, has other resources which must be taken into account when contemplating the future economic development



of the country; there are for instance great possibilities of harnessing the rivers for hydro-electric projects, these rivers hitherto having served only as a means of transportation for the timber which itself is a significant factor in the present trade of the country, providing a means of livelihood for a considerable section of the population.

Gold gravel is found in some of the rivers — in the Chitral river for instance. The mineral resources of Pakhtunistan have attracted the attention of geologists who have discovered very fine crystals of beryl and topaz in Chitral and deposits of gold together with both copper and lead, in the Swat, Chitral and Quetta districts. Prospects for the development of the lead industry in Baluchanistan, once famous for this product are very hopeful. Iron and coal deposits were discovered many years ago in Chitral, Waziristan and other parts of the country and the iron industry, though not as yet fully developed, bids fair to become the most important industry in the unoccupied part of Pakhtunistan. The guns and rifles made by the Waziris in their own munition factories are of superior quality to those made in any of the neighbouring countries. In different parts of the country other metallic ores such as bauxite, chromite, manganese and antimony are to be found, the latter having been mined by somewhat primitive methods in the Chitral district for many years past.

In addition, Pakhtunistan has the advantage of access to the sea in Baluchistan which is obviously a factor of great importance in the future trade of the country. Thus it can be seen that if due importance is attached to the obvious latent possibilities for economic development to be found in Pakhtunistan those who hold the view that Pakhtunistan will not be able "to stand on her own feet" economically as an independent state are quite mistaken. The Pakhtuns have realised that once the preservation of their freedom and independence is assured, to which all their energies have inescapably been bent in the past, they can proceed to build a prosperous life for themselves in their homeland.

# LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

The language of the Pakhtuns is called "Pukhto" ("Pashto") and is spoken in Afghanistan and Pakhtunistan and understood by a large number of people inhabiting the adjacent regions of the surrounding countries. In all, it is a language spoken by over 20,000,000 people in Central Asia.

Pukhto belongs to the Indo-European group of Aryan languages and is closely related to Sanskrit and to Zend. Recent research by eminent eastern and western philologists has demonstrated that it is Pukhto which, of all the related languages in the same group, has preserved the form of words closest to the original ancient tongue of the Aryans, a fact which has opened a new chapter not in the study of Pukhto alone, but of other Central Asian languages like Persian and even Sanskrit. Some philologists believe that Pukhto provides the direct link preserved throughout the centuries in the mountains of Ariana (Afghanistan) with the Indo-Aryan languages, a conjecture which is confirmed by a study of some of the historical Aryan words like *Aria*, *Ariana-vija*, *Ariana-Warsha*, whose roots may be traced in the Pukhto language.

The work of Afghan scholars in Kabul and Kandahar, where the *Pukhto Tolena* (Afghan Literary Academy) and the Society of Literature have been established, together with the co-operation of literary circles in Pakhtunistan and of individual philologists in Germany, France, Norway, Denmark and England, and the linguistic surveys conducted by some societies outside Afghanistan such as the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, has made a valuable contribution to modern research in the field of philology and the history of Pukhto literature. In particular, the recent grammatical studies of the *Pukhto Tolena* are said greatly to have facilitated research by western philologists which had hitherto been obstructed

by the absence of local research by those actually speaking the language, and by the inaccessibility to foreigners of sources available only to Afghan scholars.

In the *Putah Khazanah*, written in Kandahar in the year 1142 of the Islamic calendar (1729 A.D.), are reproduced some Pukhto poems belonging to the second century of the Islamic era. The manuscript, which came to light in Pakhtunistan, was first published in Kabul in an annotated edition with introduction by the Pukhto Tolena, later being translated into Persian by Abdul Hai Habibi. The other publications of the Pukhto Tolena consist of a large number of volumes on various aspects of the language, philology, grammar, history of literature, the works of Pakhto poets, etc. — and, finally, the “ *Encyclopaedia Ariana* ”.

The first Pakhto poet was Amir Krur, son of Amir Polad Suri who was Governor of Ghor (Province of Herat). He lived in the time of Abu-Muslim Khorasani and was killed in the battle of Poshang in 770 A.D.

Out of more than 2,00 poets whose works are well known to Pukhto scholars, the works of Khush-Hal Khatak (1613 - 91), Rahman Baba (1042 - 1118), Hamid Mohmand (d.1145), Pir Mohammad Kakar (d.1196), Pir Mohammad Hotak, Jamal Khatak (d.1118) and Ahmad Din (who translated into Pukhto verse the *Shah Namah* of Ferdousi and the Arabian Nights), can claim international recognition.

Khush-Hal Khatak is considered the greatest of these. His work has been translated into several European languages including English and French, and according to Major Raverty, the author of “ *The English Pukhto Grammar* ”, he was, in addition to his poetical works which amount to more than 80,000 lines, the author of some 200 volumes of prose, including translations of Persian and Arabic works. Not only was Khush-Hal Khatek a man of the pen; he was also a man of the sword, using his arms and even his poetry for the major part of his life against the Moghul Emperor of India, Aurang Zeb. He was a political leader and a great nationalist who, by his prose and poetry, awakened the same spirit in the minds of his fellow countrymen. Thus the life of Khush-Hal Khatak forms an important chapter not only in the

struggle of Afghanistan against the Moghul Emperors, but also in the separate history of Pakhtunistan. Even though the Moghul Emperors of India were great patrons of the religion of Islam, yet Khush-Hal Khatak maintained that the Paktuns were a separate nation with a legitimate right to independence in their fatherland. This, his greatest desire, he expressed in the following lines:

“ In days gone by Paktuns were Kings of Hind,  
And still in deeds the Mugul they outdo,  
But concord they know not, and they have stirred  
Against God's Unity; so come to rue;  
Ah God ! Khush-Hal would rise, a youth again,  
Could'st Thou but grant them concord, sweet refrain ! ”

The poet's wish has to-day been fulfilled by the hoisting of the flag of independent Pakhtunistan, an achievement made possible only by the unity of the Paktuns in their determination to possess their own land.



# HISTORY

The history of Pakhtunistan forms, in earlier periods, a part of the history of Afghanistan. It was only in the nineteenth century that Pakhtunistan was separated from Afghanistan by the British Government as a result of military measures and the imposition upon the Government of Afghanistan of the so-called " Durand Line " as the Afghan border.

If the British had not left India, this present era would have been the starting-point of the history of Pakhtunistan. However, with the British withdrawal and the subsequent partition of India which resulted in the creation of Pakistan as a new Islamic State, it seems more pertinent to go back rather further in the history of the region. A more proper starting-point would seem to be the introduction into India of the religion of Islam since this religion provided the sole justification for the formation of Pakistan, and still provides the sole basis for Pakistan's claim that Pakhtunistan, inhabited by followers of Islam, should be considered a part of Pakistan.

## PRE-BRITISH ERA

Although Kasim, the Arab conqueror, had reached India earlier, Islam was introduced and spread in India about the tenth century A.D. by Sultan Mahmood of Ghazni, a prominent Emperor of the Ghaznavid Empire founded in the city of Ghazni, eighty miles south of Kabul the present capital of Afghanistan. The first clash between the Muslim power in Afghanistan and the Hindu power in India had, however, taken place before the time of Sultan Mahmood when the forces of his father Sabuktagin defeated Rajah Jeypal in 986. The Wazirs and Afridis played a particularly important part in this invasion.

Sultan Mahmood of Ghazni, after seventeen repeated military expeditions aimed at spreading the religion of Islam, broke the Hindu power in the north of India from the Indus valley to the Jumna and Kanauj. These expeditions resulted in the political conquest of India by the Afghans and the establishment there of numerous Muslim communities.

The Ghaznavid dynasty was followed by the Ghoris, another Afghan dynasty. Mohammad Gori, after occupying Lahore in 1186, established an Afghan Islamic centre in the Punjab under an organized administration. He appointed as Governor of Northern India Kutubuddin Aibak, who in 1205 founded a powerful government in Delhi.

The third Afghan Empire, known as the Lodi dynasty, came into power with Sultan Altamesh. About the second half of the thirteenth century, as a result of repeated Mongol invasions, the strength of the Lodi dynasty began to weaken. The Pakhtuns, however, never ceased to fight against the Mongols and, resisting stubbornly until, after the death of Firoz, the Khiljis came into power, continued to repulse the invaders. Alauddin Khilji ruled in Delhi from 1296 - 1316, during which period he twice defeated the Mongols.

At the end of the fourteenth century Timurlane invaded Afghanistan and succeeded in breaking the power of the Afghan Empire both in India and inside Afghanistan. He died in 1414 and was succeeded by his grandson Babar.

The resistance of the Pakhtuns in Afghanistan and Pakhtunistan, and of the Afghans in general in their own country and in India, forced upon Babar the realization that he would not be able peacefully to administer the vast realm of his Empire without the recognition of the Afghans who inhabited the strategically most important regions and the unconquerable mountains and passes, where they could easily defend themselves against any invasion and from which they could attack any position on the exposed plains of India. The influence of the Afghans inside India, moreover, might at any time lead to revolution against the the Moghuls if the differences between the members of the Lodi dynasty could only be resolved.

Babar based his policy on the recognition of these factors. He made friendly terms with Alam Lodin, helped him against his nephew Ibrahim who did not believe in co-operation with the Moghuls, and, choosing Kabul as his centre, succeeded in making himself master of India after his last campaign against the Afghans in Bengal in 1528.

Babar in his memoirs mentions the Wazirs, Mohmands, Afridis and Bangash clans: " Being occupied with many affairs of State, I never found leisure to apply myself to the settlement of the Bangash ". He writes that after passing the " defiles of Khyber " he " resolved to plunder the country of the Afridi Afghans ". But bad news came from Badakhshan, so he resolved to renounce his plan. Complaining of the attitude of the Wazirs and Mohmands, he says, " The Mohmands had been extremely licentious in their conduct and the Wazirs had been very irregular in paying their taxes ".

Babar died in 1530 and was buried in Kabul. His death divided his Empire, leaving his son Kamran at the head of the Kingdom of Kabul to which the Punjab was annexed.

The Afghans continued their struggle until the rise of the next Afghan Suri dynasty when Sher Shah Suri (Sher Shah the Great) overthrew the power of Babar's son Humayun, although Jehangir later succeeded in re-building the Moghul Empire. During this time the land of the Pakhtuns, considered an impregnable region for purposes of peaceful administration, remained a stronghold of resistance against the Moghuls where the Pakhtuns would from time to time break out in revolution.

In 1627 Shah Jehan established himself on the Moghul throne. Throughout his rule the Khataks continuously revolted against him, and their repression resulted only in counter-revolution by the Yusufzais. In 1658 Shah Jehan's own son Aurang Zeb rose against his father and, after imprisoning him, was crowned Emperor. The Yusufzais relentlessly continued their opposition, staging another revolution which was suppressed in 1667 by one of the greatest military operations in the history of the Moghul Emperors.

It took the Pakhtuns five years to reorganize their position, with the Afridis this time leading the other clans in battle against the Moghuls. The policy of Aurang Zeb was founded on sowing

dissension among the tribes and so disuniting them, but in spite of his efforts there was a general uprising from Kandahar to Attack in which many thousands of the Moghul Imperial Forces were killed or captured.

Aurang Zeb also tried the policy of playing on the Islamic sentiments of the Pakhtuns by approaching them as a Muslim ruler to whom, he thought, they should submit their love of independence and their nationalism — the only time that an imperialistic policy wearing the guise of a religious crusade was used against the Pakhtuns until it was repeated after the creation of Pakistan. However, the Pakhtuns were perfectly aware of the political aims which motivated this policy, and the Khataks, under the leadership of Khush-Hal Khatak, joined the Afridis in their opposition to the Moghuls.

The terms “ Moghul-Wali ” and “ the Islam of a Moghul ” in Pushto language originated during the period of the struggles of the Pakhtuns against the Moghuls in the effort to preserve their independence. Although the Moghuls were Muslims, “ the Islam of the Moghuls ” in the language of the Pakhtuns conveyed the meaning of pseudo-Islam. “ Moghul-Wali ” means that process whereby a man for his own purpose seeks to deprive another individual, by unprincipled methods, of something which that other individual holds very dear.

“ Majesty belong to Justice  
For justice alone has the power to command;  
I will never submit to a tyrant.  
The Mosque is the House of God:  
I will never pray in it to any other master.  
  
If the Prophet could raise his head  
From under the earth where he is buried,  
I wonder whether He would recognise  
The followers who do not follow him.  
I will prefer to pray in a Moghul prison,  
Rather than in a Moghul Mosque,  
For the glories of the past and of our ancestors,  
Which, alas ! their sons have lost.”

—Khush-Hal Khatak.



These lines were most probably written when Khush-Hal Khatak was imprisoned by the Moghul Emperor Aurang Zeb, and are now, perhaps, being recited every morning by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the Pakhtun political leader, known as the "Frontier Gandhi", and Dr. Khan, the former Pakhtun premier of the North West Frontier Province, behind the bars of the Pakistani prison. They have once again faced imperialism in the guise of Moham-medanism, and they follow in the footsteps of Khush-Hal Khatak even in the prison where they pray for that for which he prayed.

After the death of Aurang Zeb in 1707 and the subsequent weakening of the Moghul Empire, the Ghilzai dynasty of Hotaks established an Afghan Empire in Kandahar. The attention of this dynasty was drawn to the West where all their energies were concentrated on the Safavid dynasty of Persia. This power the Hotaks finally overthrew, extending the Afghan realm into Persia where they ruled until 1739, when Nadir Afshar of Persia came into power.

The continuous struggle of the Pakhtuns against the Moghuls had seriously weakened both parties, paving the way for Nadir to march through Afghanistan, assisted by the Afghans, and conquer India. Immediately upon his assassination in 1747, however, the Pakhtun leader Ahmad Shah Durrani seized his opportunity to re-establish the Afghan Empire of Kandahar, succeeded in uniting Afghanistan, and marched into India. After the conquest of Sindh and Multan, he founded the Durrani Empire which extended from Persia to Delhi in India, including the Indus, the Sutlej, Hazara and Kashmir. Delhi was occupied in 1761 after the famous battle of Panipat where all the Muslim and Mahratta forces of India opposed him in the field.

Ahmad Shah ruled from 1747 - 1773, when he was succeeded by his son Timur Shah who ruled for twenty years, changing the capital of the country from Kandahar to Kabul, the present capital of Afghanistan. Timur Shah did not extend the borders of his Empire, but maintained his father's realm under a peaceful administration.

The years from 1793 to 1810 after the death of Timur Shah were years of dispute and unrest among his sons, Shah Zaman, Mahmud Shah and Shah Shuja, and saw the rapid disintegration of the Afghan Empire.

Shah Zaman, troubled by political events on the Oxus River, entrusted the administration of the Province of the Punjab to the Sikh leader Ranjit Singh who, taking advantage of the unfavourable situation inside Afghanistan, strengthened his position and within three years declared his independence, subsequently occupying the territory around Peshawar, Bannu, Kohat and some parts of the Dera Jat. Peshawar was occupied in 1820 though a part of the Province still came under the rulers of Kabul whose governors conducted the administration there from 1810 - 1834. In 1836 Peshawar was reoccupied and the Sikhs succeeded also in taking Dera Ismail Khan and Teri.

## DURING THE BRITISH RULE IN INDIA

Thus by the beginning of the nineteenth century the Afghan Empire had been sufficiently weakened to allow its overthrow and the Sikhs were receiving increasing support from the British Government. The internal situation in Afghanistan, together with the Russian moves in Central Asia, had begun to create considerable alarm with regard to the protection of the British position in India, and the situation of Afghanistan was seen to be of vital strategic importance.

Ex-Shah Shuja, who was at this time living in exile in India, placed himself at the disposal of the British Government who persuaded him to act against the Government of Afghanistan. In 1832 the British approached the Court of Kabul through Sir Alexander Burns, an emissary sent by the Government to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. After initial failure, this mission was repeated four years later, by which time Amir Dost Mohammad had established himself on the throne of Kabul.

Shah Shuja's first attempts to recover the kingdom were in vain, in spite of the support given him by the British Government. However, in 1839, when he was again lent the British Army of the Indus, these forces succeeded in reaching Kandahar. Within a year, in 1840, Kabul was occupied and Shah Shuja was made King against the will of the people.

In 1841 Shah Shuja decided to keep garrisons in Kabul, Kandahar and Ghazni, with Sir William MacNaughton as British Envoy. The Afghans revolted against the Shah and decimated the garrison in Kabul. Sir Alexander Burns lost his life and the British forces left Afghanistan "in the depths of winter, through snowy passes, pursued by Afghan bullets", events recorded by British historians as "an ill-fated expedition that vainly cost the British an army and Shah Shuja his life", and known generally as the First Anglo - Afghan War.

"The news of the catastrophe was received in England with consternation. Lord Auckland was recalled from India and Lord Ellenborough succeeded him as Governor-General", and sent an army under General Pollock which did this time succeed in reaching Kabul though it was unable to occupy the city and forced to retreat into India.

In the meantime the Sikhs had firmly entrenched their authority in the Punjab, and Kashmir was detached from the Afghan kingdom. The state of the occupied regions of Pakhtunistan was, however, a constant source of alarm to the Sikhs, who never managed to exercise any firm control over the inhabitants. According to Major James, "the maintenance of internal order was scarcely attempted".

Some years later Amir Sher Ali was invited by the British Government to Ambala in India to negotiate terms. The Amir found himself unable to agree to the terms proposed by the British and on his return to Kabul therefore entered into negotiations with Russia. This legitimate step on the part of the Afghan King was viewed as an act of war by the British Government whose forces marched forthwith into Quetta in Baluchistan, established a British agent in Gilghit and attacked Kabul from three different routes. The war resulted in victory for the British forces and Amir Sher Ali retreated to Mazar in the north where he died shortly after. The Treaty of Gandumak was imposed on his son, Amir Yaqub. Certain district of Loralai, Zhod, Peshin, Quetta and Nushki were ceded, the British seized this opportunity to occupy the passes, and a British Envoy was once more received in Kabul.

The Treaty is known as the "Condemned Treaty" among the people of Afghanistan who rose up in opposition in 1879. This

revolution was followed by the military expedition of General Roberts and Amir Yaqub abdicated, leaving his brother Ayoub to carry on the war. Severe losses were, however, again inflicted on the British forces in July, 1880.

## THE DURAND LINE

As a result of these events, Amir Abdur Rahman in 1885 signed a treaty of friendship with the British Government. In the same year a serious clash took place between Russia and Afghanistan at Panjdeh which, together with the rebellions of 1890 and 1892 inside his country and the political and economic pressure brought to bear from outside, served seriously to weaken the position of the Afghan King who had to content himself with waging diplomatic warfare against the British policy, especially in connection with the demarcation of the eastern and southern borders of Afghanistan.

In 1894 a frontier line along the top of the Sulaiman range of mountains was discussed, a proposal which in fact amounted to detaching from Afghanistan the territories of Khyber, Mohmand, Tirah, Kurram and Waziristan.

This frontier, later to become known as the "Durand Line", was drawn under duress by military force, and by political and economic pressure was forced upon Afghanistan at a critical moment in the development of the country when the Amir's policy was to avoid at all costs another war with the British. It marks the first step in the establishment of political influence by the British Government over a part of the land of the Pakhtuns.

All historians, western and eastern, British as well as Afghan, recognize the unhappy circumstances under which the Durand agreement was imposed upon Afghanistan. The Amir himself gives in his autobiography the following account of some of the events which preceded the Durand mission to Kabul:

" . . . At certain times when they (the Imperialists) are defining their boundaries with another Government, certain countries or provinces on which they have cast their eye they leave undecided; these they call neutral, and they say to the neighbouring Power: 'Now, this must be left independent; neither you nor we must



interfere'. By the pretence of calling such countries or provinces neutral, they cancel the claims of the neighbouring weak Governments to these provinces, which either wholly or in part belong to them. This being done, they begin to play their game in this so-called neutral country in such a manner that they give to the chief of the neutral country an old worn-out riding horse, some old uniforms, and so many guns or revolvers, saying to him: 'We will be friends with each other and our friendship will be sufficient to save you from attacks or aggressions by your neighbour; and you are to be our friend and independent ally'. . . . But very soon after, they easily find some excuse . . . In this manner the Indian Government took all the provinces lying to the south-east and north-east of Afghanistan, which used to belong to the Afghan Government in early times . . . "

Regarding the Durand mission, the Amir writes:

"The Viceroy was so insistent on this matter that he addressed a letter to me which was practically an ultimatum, to the effect that 'the Indian Government cannot wait for your indefinite promises of uncertain date, and therefore at such-and-such a time will draw its own conclusions'. I was seriously ill at the time, and I asked Sirdar Abdullah Khan Tokhi and Mir Munshi Sultan Mahmud Khan to select one Englishman out of those who were in my employ to be sent from Kabul to see the Viceroy, so that the matter should not become serious and irremediable. In short, I succeeded in delaying the matter in this way, and I immediately posted a letter to the Viceroy on this subject, saying that 'Mr. Pyne is going to see your Excellency, taking with him my letter, to make all necessary arrangements about the Mission.'

". . . It is necessary to mention here that in the map sent to me by the Viceroy, all the countries of Waziri, New Chaman and the railway station there, Chageh, Balund Khel, the whole of Mohmand, Asmar and Chitral and other countries lying in between, were marked as belonging to India. I accordingly wrote to the Viceroy a long letter of predictions about the frontier tribes . . . "

". . . But my advice was not appreciated, and the Indian Government was so anxious to get these frontier tribes from me that they expelled my officials from Buland Khel and Wana Zhob by force and threat of arms, saying that if they did not leave by such-



and-such an hour, they would be compelled to leave. As I was not desirous of making war and enmity with Great Britain, I had instructed all my officials to leave the place immediately after receiving such notice from the Indian officials then in residence.

“ . . . In Kafiristan, throughout the whole of Yaghistan, of Baluchistan and towards Chaman also, the Indian frontier officials were making constant interferences. The only thing that surprised me was that on the one hand the Indian Government said: ‘ We do not require any more country towards Afghanistan; we only desire to see Afghanistan a strong and independent kingdom ’, and on the other hand, having cut a tunnel through the Khojak Hills, they were pushing the railway line into my country just like pushing a knife into my vitals, and rumours that they intended making a railway line up to Kandahar with or without my consent, were being circulated everywhere and discussed in Parliament, about which I was constantly informed by my agents. In addition to this, Russia was making trouble with me about Roashan and Shignan.”

It is obvious from the written records left by Amir Abdur Rahman that the agreement was forced upon him.

The pressure which was brought to bear upon him is also indicated by Durand himself: “ The Amir wastes time in lengthy stories and dissertations, but, on the whole I am satisfied with the way things have gone. In any case I hope to have persuaded him of our friendly feeling towards him. He told me squarely the other day, ‘ I would fight you if you drove me to it. I am not a coward and I would fight though I know what the result would be. I have not forgotten Sher Ali, but I would not give up my independence without a fight for my honour ’.”

It was not only the Amir himself who was opposed to an agreement of this nature but also the people of Afghanistan who constantly voiced their opposition to any attempt that would separate a part of the Afghan territory from Afghanistan. Sir Percy Sykes, Durand’s biographer, explains the attitude of the Afghans in connection with the delimitation of the boundary between India and Afghanistan. He says that the people were hostile to the situation and “ feared that it would ultimately end in annexation. Not that this step was intended by Durand, who did not propose to move forward the administrative border of India, but merely

wished for political control. This policy has stood the test of more than 30 years, and the tribes have retained their independence ''.

Mr. Frank Noyce records that: " The negotiations between the Amir and Sir Mortimer Durand were conducted in private and no detailed account of them has ever been made public ". Noyce also writes that the Amir was not satisfied with the settlement of the dispute: " He was very desirous that the independent frontier tribes should be acknowledged as coming within his sphere of influence . . . The second commission demarcated the Indo-Afghan frontier in accordance with the Durand agreement, but the result was not altogether satisfactory and the unrest which had been prevalent along the frontier for some years previously was little, if at all, diminished ''.

The independence of the tribes was left practically unimpaired. The fact that the negotiations could not be made public, along with the circumstances under which the Amir had to avoid war against the British at a time of civil wars in Afghanistan and a threat of an attack by Russia on his country, obviously leads to the conclusion that the agreement which resulted in the demarcation of the so-called Durand Line was signed under duress. Noyce emphasizes that the agreement was signed in such a way as to impose it upon the King of Afghanistan while keeping its signature a secret from the public, whose political fate it was to decide, and continues: " This they did not at first realize. They are beginning to understand the fact that they are subject to British rule and to treat the Durand Line as non-existent ". He adds, " the Amir administers the country right up to his own boundary, but on the other side of it are tribes whose independence we have promised to respect ''.

The British Boundary Commission was attacked by the Mahsuds at Wana in 1895 which led to a fresh invasion of Waziristan. Sir William Barton, after admitting that the separation of this territory from Afghanistan was a deprivation which has since proved a permanent source of weakness to the Afghan Kingdom and that the Durand Line " excludes over a third of the Afghan people from their national kingdom ", emphasizes that " the frontier obtained in 1894 (the Durand Line) was in many respects far from what military and political considerations required. Even

so it was more or less extorted. One could hardly expect Kabul not to resent being deprived of the best fighting material on the border; it emphasized the bitter feeling of the loss of Afghanistan Irredenta from the foothills to the Indus; the Amir had not forgotten or forgiven the British for excluding the Afghans from the sea when they induced his feudatory, the Khan of Kelat, to transfer his allegiance to India. Can we wonder that with such grievances against his mighty neighbour the Amir should have endeavoured by means of allowances and presents of arms to keep up a strong Kabul party among the tribes whom the Durand Line had, as he thought, severed from his kingdom ? ”

Mr. Holditch clearly states his views on the subject as a result of his experiences in the North West Frontier:

“ Our first negotiations for a mission to Kabul were not altogether successful . . . Next, Sir Mortimer Durand was nominated as envoy, and with his nomination, the mission took practical shape. In October, 1893, a distinguished company of officials left Peshawar for Kabul, there to enter into a boundary agreement with the Amir which should for ever settle the responsibilities of the Kabul Government as regards the outlying independent tribes on our border. No survey officer was permitted to accompany the mission . . . This proved to be a mistake. No one but a survey officer could possibly give an authoritative opinion on the subject of the maps which were to illustrate the line through 1,300 or 1,400 miles of boundary . . . There is also a certain value in the proper use of technical expressions in formulating an agreement which is (and must always be in the case of boundaries) based on geographical considerations.” It is added that the Amir did not sign the maps which were supposed to be illustrative of the agreement.

“ . . . It requires no great strain of the imagination, and not much reading between the lines of official correspondence, to conceive that the Amir disliked the boundary exceedingly. There was little or no military glory to be won in Kafiristan. But Bajaur and Swat and the Mohmand country — were they not full of his own people, who being already allied to him by ties of faith, of language, and of kinship, should learn to recognize his direct authority ?

“ In the far south, too, his outposts had pushed forward into Baluchistan, and had occupied positions which gave them command of the trade routes between Sistan and Quetta which it was most desirable that we should open without Afghan interference and Afghan imposts. Here again he must not only stay his hand, but actually withdraw his troops. That he should like this curtailment of his power, this lowering of his *izzat* in the eyes of his own *darbar*, is quite inconceivable. He did not like it, but he signed the agreement all the same (and accepted our offer of six lacs per annum further subsidy) silently reserving to himself the right of disputing the boundary in detail when it should come to the process of actual demarcation.

“ As for the independent tribespeople themselves,” he adds, “ they were not afraid. They probably knew very little till the matter was explained to them by their mullahs. Their general view of the situation (as I gathered, not from one, but from every tribesman whom I have questioned) was that the Indian Government meant annexation. Hitherto there had been no very definite ideas about a boundary between themselves and Afghanistan. Their back doors opened on to the Afghan country, and they could pass through them in times of difficulty occasioned by their own lawless proceedings on the Indian border, and be certain of that asylum which no true Mahomedan can refuse to a brother in distress. Possibly they might even get active assistance in opposing the Sirkar. Under any circumstances they were connected by ties of faith and brotherhood with the West, and not with the East . . . They were not afraid of Afghan annexation. They had held their own from time immemorial, and could hold it still (or believed they could), but they were afraid (speaking generally that is, for there were small communities who officially protested that they wished to be taken under British protection) of the ever-advancing overlap of the red spaces in the map of India.”

Thus the tribal territory remained separate and independent between Afghanistan and the British India. Even if the treaties of Afghanistan with the Government of Great Britain had not lapsed by virtue of the departure of the British from India, neither India nor Pakistan would have had the right to claim the independent tribal territory as a part of India or Pakistan. As Mr. Davies



writes of the results which became evident at a later date: " That part of the Durand Agreement of 1893 which affected the Indo-Afghan frontier resulted in the delimitation of a line, afterwards known as the Durand Line, across which neither the Amir nor the Government of India was to interfere in any way " .

On the other hand the British realized the situation as it affected the people of Afghanistan and even the Amir himself. The biography of Sir Mortimer Durand contains a full account of the Mission to Kabul written by Durand himself. In June of 1893 he wrote: " I have been nominated to go to Kabul. I cannot say that it is a duty I look forward to with unmixed pleasure, for the Amir is not fond of giving up territory and he is likely to be extremely unpleasant on the subject as he has already been about the Kushk business " .

Even with the existence of all difficulties in connection with the Afghan border on the north, the keen interest of the Afghan people in the North West Frontier question was expressed by the Amir. Durand quotes him as saying: " We must finish this business first, as you have begun with it, but really the other frontier is the more important one " . Durand adds that the Amir told him that to his people the Indo-Afghan border was more important and " they care very much to know exactly how they stand on your side " .

Durand's biographer mentions the tension that existed at that time. " The Mission to the Amir of Afghanistan excited intense interest in India," he says, " and to a lesser degree, in Great Britain. As was but natural, there were gloomy prognostications that its members would share the fate of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his staff . . . Actually everything depended on the life of the Amir: had he been assassinated or died of sickness during the presence of the Mission in the country, there would undoubtedly have been great risk of attack by an armed mob actuated by fanaticism and greed " .

Sykes continues that the question at issue between the Governments of Afghanistan and the British had been the cause of much " ill-feeling and suspicion " on the part of the Afghan Amir and says that " a single example that has already been referred to was the tunnelling of the Khojak range, and the extension of the rail-



way to New Chaman. So strongly did His Highness feel on this question that none of his subjects dared to use the new railway station but, as before the construction of the line, carried their goods over the Khojak range on camels, thus totally ignoring its existence. The Amir had shown deep hostility and jealousy to the British maintaining direct relations with the independent tribes lying between India and Afghanistan, more especially the Waziris, the Afridis and the peoples of Bajaur and Swat”.

The authors of “*The Cambridge History of India*” admit that: “The importance of this agreement has been overrated. It is true that by putting an end to the existing uncertainty the demarcation of this boundary should have facilitated frontier administration, but a knowledge of frontier history since 1893 shows that the agreement increased not only the responsibilities of the Government of India, but also the chances of collision with the tribes and of war with the Amir. The new boundary line was not based upon sound topographical data, for, during the process of demarcation it was discovered that certain places marked on the map did not exist on the actual ground”.

Thus as summarised by Mr. G. B. Scott “After the settlement of the Russo-Afghan boundary the British Government considered the time had come for a more satisfactory settlement of the responsibility and control of the frontier tribes between the Afghan and Indian Governments in some way that would lessen the friction caused at intervals by tribes who had compelled the British to take military action, claiming to be Afghan subjects, or when followed into the hills, seeking and obtaining refuge among tribes farther west, undoubtedly subjects of Afghanistan, where, also, many criminal outlaws fled from justice. The Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, having addressed Amir Abdul Rahman on the subject, and the Amir having invited a friendly discussion, a mission under Mr. (afterwards Sir) Mortimer Durand was sent to Kabul, and, after a time, obtained, very reluctantly, the signature of the Amir to an agreement which placed Waziristan, the Mohmand country beyond the Kumar, Chitral and Yusufzai tribes within the control and responsibility of the Indian Government. The Amir, at the same time, warned the Viceroy that the subjection and the management of the tribes would be no easy job, and it would be far better

to make them over to the Amir, as they were of the same race and religion. In 1894, Lord Elgin being Viceroy, it was decided to start the demarcation of the new boundaries, and two boundary commissions, with strong escorts, were detailed for the purpose, one starting on the Gomal, the other on the Kabul and Kunar rivers. The former, with an escort of 3,000 infantry and some guns, starting from Dera Ismael Khan, entered the Waziri country and formed an entrenched camp at Wana, about ten miles north of the Gomal river and the same distance east of the new boundary line . . . On the 4th November an attack similar to that on Colonel Lumsden's camp, in 1860, by the same tribe (the Waziri) was made just before dawn, sword in hand." Hence the demarcation was started after a military occupation of the territory and with an escort of a large military force, which explains the circumstances in which the Durand Line was drawn up.

## UNDER BRITISH PROTECTION

Under the British rule the territory thus separated from Afghanistan was divided by the British Administrative Border into two main parts. The region between the River Indus and the Administrative Border, which was later combined with the Punjab for a short period of time, was known as the North West Frontier Province, while the land between the Administrative Border and the Durand Line was given the name of "Independent Tribal Territory", sometimes referred to as the "North West Frontier".

The British administration was limited to the Administrative Border and the tribal territory remained an independent zone between Afghanistan and British India. Thus, as a result of the Durand Agreement one part of the territory separated from Afghanistan came under the political influence of the British Government. The independent territory is also referred to by some writers as Yaghistan, which means "the land of those who would not accept any yoke". The status of this territory, according to British historians, was that of a British protectorate. In the words of Sir William Barton: "Tribal territory, Yaghistan, or the country of the independent tribes as it is often called between the British Administrative Border and the Durand Line, is in theory a British

Protectorate. It has not been annexed; the tribes have not accepted our rule, their status internationally is that of British protected subjects; they are entitled to British protection in foreign countries ''.

The status of the territory between the Indus and the British Administrative Border was different. It was combined for a short period of time, with the Punjab, and a system of administration similar to that of other provinces of the British India was for some time tested, but never proved successful. According to Sir William Barton, " this was a cardinal error to which most of the subsequent troubles of the new rulers are due. The British failed to realize that the Afghan borderland had no affinities with India proper. From every point of view, ethnic, linguistic, geographical, as well as in traditions and history, it differs widely from the Punjab. For more than a century, omitting the short interval of Sikh rule, it has formed part of the Afghan Kingdom to which it was united by sentiment and loyalty as well as by race. Where the national spirit is so strong as it is with the Pathan, the expectation that the British official Hierarchy would wean him from his attachment to a ruler who embodied Afghan or Pathan nationalism was based on the flimsiest grounds ". Sir William adds that, " even before the Afghan war of 1878 it had become obvious that the policy of the closed border had been a hopeless failure. The tribes felt that they had no part or lot in the Pax Britannica of the administered territory and that the British Government had no use for them ". The territory was split up into five political districts: the Malakand, the Khyber, the Kurram, North and South Waziristan.

Lord Curzon, as a result of the events which followed the attempt to annex the Pakhtun territory to the Punjab, decided to constitute a separate frontier administration directly under the Central British Government. This policy was the result of the realization by the British Government that the land of the Pakhtuns should be reorganized, not as a part of India — a fact which is of great significance in the study of the political history of Pakhtunistan and the claim of the Pakhtuns to independence after the partition of India. Peshawar was chosen as the capital of the Pakhtun province. In the words of the same British historian: " It is the centre of Pathan life and influence on the border. Under the

Afghan regime for nearly 100 years it was second in importance only to Kabul itself. Kabul has left an indelible stamp on the life of the great frontier city. The valley of about 3,500 square miles in which it stands is one of the most picturesque and desirable tracts of India. Encircled by hills through which break the Kabul river and its tributaries, the Bara and the Swat, it is noted for its fertility. It is hardly surprising that it is held and owned by one of the strongest races in Asia ”.

Thus under the British rule Pakhtunistan was considered apart from the rest of the British possessions and was divided, because of administrative difficulties, into two parts of which only one was directly attached to the British Government, the second being recognised as an independent zone between the Afghan and the British borders.

The importance attached by the British Government to the independent territory arose from consideration of the defence of India. Sir Harry Lumsden in his report on the Caundhar Mission writes: “ Providence has blessed us with a strong line of frontier, covered by rugged and barren hills, through which there are but a limited number of passes by which an army could approach India; and the military art teaches us that the best position for the defence of such ground is on our own side of the passes, just where an army must debouch on the plain ”.

With all these considerations the patriotism of the people of Pakhtunistan never allowed their rulers any relief. The ultimate object of the Pakhtun was not only to be considered as apart from India, an aim which he had already achieved, but to be independent and free from any foreign yoke. This remained a constant source of trouble between the people and their rulers. Whenever there was a movement for independence in India, the Pakhtuns would join the insurgents and, if suppressed in India, would then agitate for their own independence.

These feelings were not based, as some writers have tried to show, on religious sentiments only. The history of political developments in India reveals that the Pakhtuns have always been on the side of those fighting for independence and have without exception opposed those who would help the foreign rulers to remain. This explains why most of the political leaders of Pakhtunistan joined



the Hindu parties, abandoning their Muslim circles which were not sufficiently progressive in their struggle for independence.

Evidence of this single-mindedness was given at the time of partition when a Muslim state was going to be formed by the name of Pakistan, and the Pakhtuns once again expressed their opposition to any foreign rule, even should the rulers share their religious beliefs. The fact that these considerations did to some extent weigh with the British Government was responsible for the separation of Pakhtunistan from provinces of India. Sir Wiliam Barton wrote in 1939: "An analysis of Pathan mentality must take account of the patriotism which in the last century and a half has developed a consciousness of separate political interest. This feeling is doubtless even stronger in the tribes under Afghan rule, but it is shared by the tribes in the British tribal hinterland and there can be no doubt that the Pathan of the administered area is not prepared to throw in his lot with India except on terms that would preserve the identity of his people as a nation apart from the people of India.

"The perennial difficulty of border administration is that between the political boundary and the Indus is a tract of country 40,000 square miles in area, which although ethnographically and geographically part of the heritage of Afghan nationalism, lies within the Indian Empire. The vast majority of the population is Pathan . . . For nearly a century in the first youth of Afghan nationalism (from about the middle of the eighteenth century) the border country had been included in the boundaries of the Afghan Kingdom. The political aspirations of the Pathans of the North West Frontier — one might almost term the country *Afghanistan Irredenta* — are towards Kabul. The British Government has here to deal with the problem of a political minority which it has hitherto found impossible to assimilate in India."

Barton suggested that the only policy which could have eliminated the problem of the frontier would have been to renounce the almost impossible idea of assimilating this minority into the political structure of India.

"An autonomous Pathan Province may be allowed to develop not 'from the point of view of all-India interests, external and internal', but avowedly on the theory of 'the Pathan self-determin-



ation for self-development in the separate Province.' It is conceded by the highest officers that the whole border, both Cis-and trans-Frontier is one inseparable unit, because the people living on each side of the border are of the same ethnic type — the Pathan, and in the words of Sir John Moffey, the Chief Commissioner, 'should be regarded as one, for reasons of community of race, religion, customs and sentiments of its inhabitants'. The Province is officially likened to a 'powder magazine', where 'the conditions are very electric'."

In the so-called Reforms Scheme it was recognised that: "There existed a strong and conscious desire for participation in the reforms which must be satisfied.

"Whereas most of the Hindus of the Province, and the Urban Hindus in a body, demand satisfaction of their political aspirations in a larger entity, the majority of the Muslims, and the Pathan almost to a man, will not be content with the fulfilment of their political aspirations save within their own Province."

It was stated in the Bray Committee Report that: "If self-determination is to be allowed any play at all in India it should surely be allowed to the Pathan race whom Providence has interposed between India and foreign aggression". The British authorities had, however, realized that, quoting General Sir George MacMunn: "We have to remember that an attempt to take over hills across the administrative border, disarm the tribes and occupy the area would have meant prolonged bloodshed and ill-will".

Thus the real source of the uprisings in the Pakhtun territory lay in the passionate desire of the inhabitants for the independence of their fatherland. Since the British belonged to a different faith, they habitually interpreted any opposition as arising from the religious sentiments of the people and ignored their impatience for independence from all foreign influence.

History makes it clear that this interpretation had no sound basis. It is true that the political leaders of Pakhtunistan did make use, during the British rule, of the religious sentiments of the people as a means of achieving their goal, but this in no way shows that the struggle of the Pakhtuns for freedom was a purely religious fight. Going back down the history of the country we have already seen that the Pakhtuns faced other imperialists before the British

came to India. The Moghul Emperors of India had attempted to deprive the Pakhtuns of their independence, but even though the Moghuls were considered great patrons of the Islam religion, the spirit of nationalism among the Pakhtuns never allowed them to accept their domination. The period of Moghul power in India is one of continuous struggle for independence by the Pakhtun people.

If more final proof is needed, it may surely be found to-day, for if the struggle of the Pakhtuns had been directed solely against the British as a Western Power or as a power which belonged to a different religion, this problem would have been solved by the British withdrawal from India.

## AFTER PARTITION

The partition of India was based solely on religious considerations. India was divided into two parts — a Hindu State and a Muslim State.

Setting aside the many intrinsic defects of this policy, the fate of the non-Indian peoples who had been under British influence and protection in this part of Asia was not clearly defined, and the statements made by the British officials at the time of their withdrawal were vague and often difficult to interpret.

In the Declaration of Independence of the sub-continent of India, any ruling as to the future of those territories which had been taken from India's neighbours and never considered as a part of India was altogether omitted.

As for the Pakhtun leaders themselves, they had loudly voiced the desire of their people for independence at the time of partition. According to an Associated Press Report, Dr. Khan, Frontier Premier before partition, stated on the 21st December, 1946, in New Delhi: "The Frontier people have never bothered themselves about sections and groups. They will have their independence and nobody can force them to join anyone. It is for the Frontier people to decide, and if they decide by majority vote that they will not join any group nobody can force them". His attention being drawn to the fact that the Punjab had a majority vote in the proposed "B Section", Khan Sahib said: "I definitely tell

you that nobody in the world can force us to join. The majority of the Punjab has nothing to do with us. It is only the majority in the Frontier that counts ”.

Thus the question of Pakhtunistan and the desire of the Pakhtuns for an independent state in their own territory was raised long before the State of Pakistan came into existence. The movement for independence, which had begun years ago in the territories under the British administration, was only strengthened by the new situation.

On June 3, 1947 Lord Louis Mountbatten, Viceroy of India, made a statement on behalf of the British Government regarding the issues to be decided in connection with the transference of power to the people of India. In Paragraph 11 of this statement, referring to the position of the N.W.F.P., the Viceroy said: “ The position of the N.W.F.P. is exceptional ”, and went on to explain that this was “ in view of its geographical situation and other considerations ”. In Paragraph 12, speaking about Baluchistan he again said that “ in view of its geographical situation . . . this province will also be given an opportunity to reconsider its position ”. In connection with the tribes of the North West Frontier the words of the Viceroy (Paragraph 17 of the statement) were: “ Agreements with the tribes of the North West Frontier of India will have to be negotiated with the appropriate successor authority ”.

On June 4, 1947 the Viceroy held a Press Conference in which he explained, although not very clearly, some of the points of the British Government’s statement.

In connection with the question of the N.W.F.P., when he was asked whether any province would be free to vote itself out of one Union and join the other, or join neither, he replied that he avoided answering this question at the moment because he was not there to give decisions. “ I am here ” he said, “ to try and help the Indian people to do what they want to do ”.

He was reminded of the desire of the Pakhtuns to form an independent Pathan State, and he was asked if he knew that in the case of the N.W.F.P. the party had on the last occasion, at the time of the elections, tried to clarify the position; that they would like to form an independent Pathan State. His reply was that this

question had been raised as a matter of general principle, but had not been accepted as such by the Leaders of the parties. When asked if the parties were unanimous in turning this question down, he said: "What I said was that we discussed the principle whether any province should be obliged to vote for one or other of the two Constituent Assemblies. That is what I said". The questioner remarked: "The Frontier Province probably did not know all that. As soon as they came to know that there was going to be a Sovereign Bengal, they thought that a Sovereign Pathan State will also come into being afterwards". In reply, the Viceroy stated that he would agree to anything which the Leaders or Parties in Delhi would agree to: "But I must work through a particular system. It will be quite wrong for me to go over the heads of the people in India. I am not trying to settle the future of India, and the Congress leaders have decided not to permit 'independence' ". He was reminded that the Congress Party was supporting the demand of the Frontier people for independence, and in response to the question whether the Frontier people were free to select the issue on which they would vote in the referendum, he said: "Yes, it is very simple". When asked: "Can they decide whether they wish to remain independent or whether they wish to join some Constituent Assembly?", his reply was: "If the Frontier were to vote for independence and if they can get the two High Commands to agree, I will, of course, agree". The questioner then said: "Your Excellency in reply to my question said in regard to the Frontier you could not conceive of a few million people trying to separate into an independent State. In Paragraph 18 the Indian States, at least some of them, have perhaps an area of fifty square miles and they will become independent overnight. Has Your Excellency also foreseen this, where we could prevent Balkanisation of a very bad form in those areas which become independent overnight, when in fact these areas are much less than the areas on the Frontier where you will not allow a referendum on the independence issue?" The reply was: "That was an expression of opinion. So far as I am concerned, the Frontier can be independent as soon as the leaders of the two parties say so".

The Afghan Government and Press protested against the impression that the statement gave, to the effect that the fate of



the Pakhtuns should be decided by the desire of any political party in India, and that the legitimate right of independence of the people should be transferred from one foreign Power to another foreign Power. It was stated to be unjust that, at the moment when Muslim and Hindu communities of India were granted their independence, the non-Indian community of the Pakhtuns should be deprived of their rights.

It was at this time that the question of a referendum in the North West Frontier began to be discussed in some of the political circles concerned. The most important and the most difficult question was to reach an agreement on the nature of the referendum. Some people thought that it should be contested on the issue of Hindustan and Pakistan, which meant on the issue of the *Hindu and Muslim religions*. This idea was based on the same principle as that which had led to the partition of India into a Hindu and a Muslim State, a policy unsupported by historical, geographical, racial or cultural considerations. Others maintained that the issue should be of Pathanistan, Pakistan and Hindustan. Such a referendum would have expressed the desire of the entire population, that is to say, the Hindus and Muslims of India as well as the Afghans or Pathans, who, although they had also come under British influence, were yet completely separate entities from the Hindus and the Muslims of India, having only one thing in common with the Indian Muslims, namely the Islam religion, Khan Abdul Ghaffar, the famous frontier leader, addressing a public meeting at Bannu on the 22nd June, 1947, said that the Pakhtuns were prepared to contest the Frontier Referendum on the issue of Pathanistan and Pakistan, but not on the issue of Pakistan and Hindustan. He invited Frontier Muslim leaders to sit with him to draw up a constitution for Pathanistan.

In his words was expressed the real desire of the Pakhtuns but unfortunately the British authorities decided that the referendum should be held on the issue of Pakistan and Hindustan.

This decision met with great opposition from the Pakhtuns who declared that they would not take part in a referendum of this nature. Abdul Quayum said on the 26th June, 1947: "As one of the two parties to the referendum is not contesting it, it is now for His Majesty's Government to declare the Frontier Province



part of the proposed Pakistan''. This statement by a Muslim League Leader was made only after the League was sure of the support of the British authorities.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan said: "Recent developments have placed great difficulties in our way. In the announcement of June 3rd it has been stated that a referendum will be held in the North West Frontier Province where the only alternative before the electors of the present Legislative Assembly will be whether to join the Indian Union Constituent Assembly. This limits our choice to two alternatives, neither of which we are prepared to accept. We cannot vote as we want to vote for a free Pathan state". Maintaining that the great majority of the Pakhtuns were for the establishment of a free Pathan state, he said: "In these circumstances I am convinced that we cannot associate ourselves with this referendum . . . but this does not mean that we should sit still. A new struggle has been forced upon us. However, I wish that even at the eleventh hour Jinnah had recognized the justice of our position and refrained from dividing the Pathans from the Pathans".

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, addressing another public meeting near Charsadda on June 28, 1947, said the Pakhtuns wanted Pathanistan as an independent state ruled by the Pathans. "The main object" he added, "is to make the Pathan free from domination. For this independence of the Pathans we sided with Congress and fought our common enemy jointly. We were then called Hindu agents. Now, when we have refused to join Hindustan, we are forced to fight the referendum issue of Pakistan versus Hindustan".

On June 30, Mr. Jinnah said: "It is obvious that the Pakistan Constituent Assembly can only frame a constitution wherein the Frontier will be an autonomous unit and in which the Frontier people will be their own masters, regulating their own social, cultural and educational matters besides the general administration of the Province as a unit of the Pakistan federal government, like any other province or unit in Pakistan". Foreseeing that the Government of Pakistan "would not interfere with the freedom of the North West Frontier".

On 1st July, Sir Rob Lockhart, Frontier Governor, declared at a Press Conference that referendum should be held despite the boycott by one political party.

This decision of the British Government was an unexpected shock to the Pakhtuns both in Pakhtunistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan considered the question one that should be decided between the British and the Afghan Governments, but found herself in a delicate situation during these discussions. She was faced on the one hand with the desirability of preserving friendly relations with Great Britain, and on the other with avoiding any measure which might hinder the development of the situation in India, whose independence was desired by all the people of Asia, and especially by her neighbour Afghanistan.

The referendum was held against the will of the Pakhtuns of whom the most powerful and well-organized bodies comprising over 50 per cent of the population did not vote, including the well-known Khudai-Khidmatgar Party, popularly called the "Red Shirts", of the N.W.F.P. and the Anjuman-e-Watan of Baluchistan, who enjoyed the confidence of the Pakhtun population of these provinces.

An official Press Communique issued in Kabul (see Afghanistan Magazine No. 3/1947) declared: ". . . In spite of the boycott of a great majority of the Afghans, the forced referendum was enforced and carried out in Afghan Baluchistan and the N.W.F.P. Both were given to Pakistan. But our claim stand as it was, and Afghanistan has already announced that Afghanistan will not acknowledge the results of the above-mentioned obligatory and unjust referendum".

By this time the State of Pakistan had been established. The political leaders of Pakhtunistan, including Khan Abdul Ghaffer Khan, Dr. Khan Sahib, Pir Sahib of Zakori, Shareef Khan, Abdussamad Khan, and even their relatives, were put in prison and a large number of arrests were daily carried out by the Government of Pakistan.

The Government of Afghanistan now had to approach the Government not only of Great Britain but also that of Pakistan. A special envoy visited Karachi in 1948.

In the course of direct negotiations between Dr. Najibullah, Special Envoy of the Afghan Government, and the Pakistan statesmen in Karachi the latter conceded that they would recognize the freedom of the Pakhtuns within the independent territory. This

admission was confirmed by a letter dated 1st January, 1948, from Sir Mohammad Zafarullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, to Dr. Majibullah, and later by a statement made by Mr. Fazlur-Rahman, the Pakistan Minister of Education, during his tour of the North West Frontier.

The Government of Afghanistan clearly explained its policy in connection with the North West Frontier to the Government of Pakistan, and also to the members of the United Nations.

Mr. Aziz, head of the Afghan delegations to the United Nations General Assembly stated: " We cannot recognize the North West Frontier as a part of Pakistan so long as the people of the North West Frontier shall not have been given an opportunity, free from any kind of influence — I repeat, free from any kind of influence — to determine for themselves whether they wish to be independent or to become a part of Pakistan. Afghanistan cannot remain unaffected by, and therefore cannot be indifferent to, any measures which would affect the hearths and homes of these peoples ".

When the dispute over the Kashmir question arose between Pakistan and India, the Government of Pakistan changed its policy towards the Pakhtuns by stating that Jinnah's promise of non-interference in Pakhtun territory would be fulfilled. As a result of this declaration the Pakistan Government withdrew the regular troops which the British Government had maintained in Waziristan and other tribal territories. The Pakhtuns were told by the Government of Pakistan that as soon as the war was over in Kashmir the independence of Pakhtunistan would be recognized.

This statement was satisfactory not only to the Pakhtuns but also to the Government of Afghanistan which was desirous of seeing the question peacefully settled. Although there were some groups among the Pakhtuns who did not believe in postponement of the recognition of the independent state of Pakhtunistan, all efforts were made by the Government of Afghanistan, through negotiations with the leaders of Pakhtunistan, to convince them of the desirability of a peaceful solution to the problem. Some of the people went so far in the expression of their desire for a peaceful settlement that they even took part in the guerilla fighting in Kashmir against the Indians, but at the end of the fighting the Government of Pakistan failed to fulfil their promise to recognize Independent Pakhtunistan.

Indeed, the Government of Pakistan not only failed to fulfil their promises; they went so far as to lodge a claim to the territory as a part of Pakistan, thus arousing the open opposition and hostility of the Pakhtuns. The Governor General of Pakistan made a statement declaring that the Pakhtun territory was an integral part of Pakistan inherited from the British Government, and asserting that the frontier of Pakistan was the Durand Line and that she was thus the inheritor of all rights and interests maintained up to 1947 by the British Government in India.

This statement resulted in a general uprising all over the Pakhtun territory, and the dispatch by the Government of Pakistan of troops to suppress the movement. The Pakistan Air Force bombed some Pakhtun villages, killing men, women and children. The following is a detailed account of the bombardment from 17th March, 1950, to 22nd October, 1950:

On 17th March, 1950, the Pakistan Forces assisted by heavy artillery fire and 8 tanks attacked the people of Miranshah and Mirali. In that operation 19 fighter planes also participated, the result being that 8 defenceless persons were martyred and 3 badly wounded. In addition, heavy losses were caused to the houses and buildings of the Uraki Pass.

On 15th June, 1950, 3 Pakistani bombers attacked the suburbs of Miranshah and caused considerable losses to the villages.

On 24th July, 1950, the Pakistani planes heavily attacked the villages of Matha Khan and Pathak Khan, Sara Khor in Ahmedzai district, as a result of which a great part of those villages was destroyed.

On 24th July, 1950, Pakistani bombers attacked the Ahmedzai villages in Wana and later the same day another plane brought those places under heavy machine gun fire and bombardment and destroyed many parts of those villages.

On 26th July, 1950, a group of Pakistani planes bombarded the village of Abdul Hai Patani in the Spin Kamar district and a number of villages suffered heavy financial losses.

On 5th August, 1950, 4 Pakistani planes dropped many different calibre bombs over the villages around Wana Districts that caused heavy damage to the buildings and houses of the inhabitants.



On 29th July, 1950, 1 Pakistani plane raided the villages of Ahmedzai of Wazir tribe, as a result of which one woman was very badly wounded.

On 7th August, 1950, 5 Pakistani planes heavily attacked the village of Tapus Khan in Masud District, which caused the death of two men and six children.

Between 5th and 7th August, 1950, 16 Pakistani planes attacked the village of Shalam Gharib of Wana, as a result of which the greater part of the houses and buildings in the village were ruined and destroyed.

On 12th September, 4 Pakistani planes attacked the village of Zali Khel, clan of the Dara Khal Dawar, as a result of which a part of the village was devastated, in addition to which one goat and one calf were killed.

From 6th to 9th September, 4 Pakistani planes attacked the village of Nori Khel, Shamak Khel and Abdul Ali (the inhabitants are Balol-Zai of Masud), these planes made daily attacks, as a result of which 7 men and 2 little girls were killed, and 4 upper stories of a tower and 8 rooms with 2 gardens and a mill and 20 acres of agricultural land were destroyed.

On 4th October, 8 planes of Pakistan bombarded heavily the village around Wana as a result of which the village of Paya Khan of Taji Khel clan and Awal Khan Zali Khel and Nazim Gul Khan were completely ruined and very heavy damage was caused.

On 22nd October, 2 Pakistani planes attacked the village near Baberi Ghondi for five hours continuously with considerable financial losses to the innocent people.

This is a concrete account of Pakistan aggression and a proof of the struggle of Pakhtun Nation for its liberation.

One aircraft, over-passing the borders of Pakhtunistan, dropped bombs on a village inside Afghanistan, which incident was later stated to have taken place by mistake, the Government of Pakistan expressing itself ready to pay the damages. Throughout Afghanistan, however, this attack was considered as an act of war, and the Government was urged by the people to take measures against Pakistan. The Government with difficulty succeeded in maintaining peace and in calming the demonstrations in Afghanistan and Pakhtunistan against the aggressive act of the Government



of Pakistan, and expressed the hope that through diplomatic channels a peaceful solution of the problem might still not prove impossible.

The Government of Pakistan unfortunately underestimated the friendly spirit in which the Afghan Government wished to handle the situation. Further bombing attacks were carried out on Pakhtunistan and economic pressure was brought to bear on Afghanistan by the withholding of transit imports from Europe and America which had to pass through Pakistan to Afghanistan. The import of petroleum from Pakistan for Afghan tanks was also refused.

The continuation of Pakistan's aggressive policy in Pakhtunistan and economic blockade on Afghanistan have considerably increased the tension between the two countries. His Majesty, the King of Afghanistan in his opening speech before the House of Representatives, said: "Afghanistan's relations with friendly countries, especially neighbouring States and Islamic countries, as well as its participation in international problems and undertakings are progressing well. Some officials of the Pakistan Government, however, have misinterpreted our stated intentions; great obstacles have been created affecting Afghanistan's relations with our neighbouring state Pakistan have suffered, notwithstanding Afghanistan's desire to the contrary. The aggressive action by Pakistan aircraft bombing the Afghan territory increased tension and obliged the Afghan Government to take serious steps.

"Although Afghanistan observes the obligations of friendship and has expressed her desire to co-operate with Pakistan, note also must be taken of the freedom-loving aspirations and the repeated protests of the trans-Durand Afghans, and, having regard to the principles of justice and the right of these people to their independence, Afghanistan is responsible for the attainment of their oft-desired independence. The Afghan Government has waited patiently and with perseverance in the hope that these problems would be peacefully settled, but so far no satisfactory reply from Pakistan has been received."

The following resolution was adopted by the Afghan House of Representatives in connection with the policy of the Government regarding the question of Pakhtunistan: "The Afghan nation is

deeply alive to the dangers of Pakistan's creation of hindrances and obstacles affecting Afghanistan's political and commercial affairs, as well as Pakistan's efforts to oppress the independence of Frontier Pakhtun Provinces from Chitral up to Baluchistan''. The Parliament indicated that it recognizes neither the "imaginary Durand nor any similar line", and it therefore resolved to co-operate fully with the Government in overcoming commercial and political difficulties and achieving the independence of all Afghan brothers.

The people of Pakhtunistan had by this time elected their representatives to the first Pakhtun Provisional Parliament, with a branch in Tirah under the leadership of the Afridi clan and another branch at Groek in Waziristan, to which a general assembly of all Pakhtun clans had declared their allegiance. The flag of independent Pakhtunistan was hoisted and the following declaration by the Pakhtunistan National Assembly was published, addressed to all the people of Pakhtunistan, to the entire Muslim world and particularly Afghanistan, to all Pakhtuns living abroad, and to the United Nations Organisation. This proclamation was also broadcast over Radio Kabul.

## THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION

"We (the Tirah Branch) of the National Assembly of Pakhtunistan, having formed the first nucleus of a free and democratic Muslim Government amidst the lofty mountains of Tirah, hereby express the hope that, with the help of Almighty God and the support of the brave and freedom-loving Pakhtoons, this young plant may in a short time grow into a sturdy and fruitful tree which

will not only benefit Pakhtunistan (from Chitral to Baluchistan, and from Khyber and Bolan to the banks of Indus) but will also fulfil its obligations to the cause of progress and world peace.

“ For the fulfilment of this sacred objective we expect the following from the Pakhtun people:

“ (1) *From the Learned and Spiritual Leaders:*

According to the tenets of the Holy Quran, to the sayings of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and to the teaching of all the religions of the world, freedom and liberty are the inalienable right of all peoples irrespective of colour and creed. In pursuance of the sacred goal of independence, we therefore request the true spiritual leaders to preach the principles of unity and liberty and to caution the masses of Pakhtunistan against the vicious propaganda of the self-styled spiritual leaders, who for ulterior motives and material gains have become instrumental in plagiarising the text of the Holy Quran to the end of enslaving the freedom-loving people of Pakhtunistan. Let them warn these Quislings that the people of Pakhtunistan have an unswerving devotion to the cause of Freedom and have an abiding faith in their spiritual and temporal leaders, and that with their guidance they will eventually defeat the dark forces which threaten their cherished goal — independence.

“ (2) *From the Nobles and the Elders:*

The masses of Pakhtunistan, under the able guidance of your forefathers and your own benevolent leadership, have repeatedly and successfully beaten off the aggressive advances of the imperialistic power and have gallantly defended their beloved soil from foreign subjugation. Your noble efforts to hold at bay the British for over 100 years bear testimony to your magnificent sense of sacrifice and superior quality of leadership. Your trials and tribulations have not ended. The evil forces of vested interest, under the guise of religion and false promises, would like to trample upon your hard-won freedom, and to bring you nothing but slavery, misfortune and exploitation. In the face of such diabolical intrigues it is your duty and obligation to accept once again the challenge and to

deliver your people from the clutches of the sinister forces of imperialism and domination. The masses are with you; and are anxiously awaiting your guidance. Your responsibilities are greater than ever. Were you to fail now in discharging your sacred obligations to your people you would defeat the cause of the Pakhtuns for generations to come, forcing your children to carry the yoke of foreign domination and slavery.

“(3) *From the Rich:*

Pakhtunistan is born. You have a distinct obligation to your country, because your country needs financial and material support. You are honour-bound to perform your duty towards your country, especially when your beloved land is in the throes of strangulation by a cunning foe. Richness will be yours when prosperity and freedom greet your people: hence it is your moral and spiritual obligation towards your people and your country to make material sacrifices.

“(4) *From the Young:*

You have always fought bravely to protect your country, honour, esteemed reputation and cherished independence. To have what is rightfully yours you have fought to ward off your evil enemies from taking possession of your beautiful mountain abode. These lofty mountains and the long green valleys which are the dumb witnesses of your unforgettable devotion and sacrifice in the past, now once again await your heroic intrepidity and reckless devotion. Your mothers and sisters look to your courage and devotion to guarantee their future happiness in freedom and self-rule. Therefore, step forward and stand united behind your national representatives. Challenge the evil and sinister forces of foreign imperialism that your beautiful country and your freedom-loving people may rid themselves once and for all of the alien rule and domination.

“(5) *From Afghanistan:*

We, the representatives of the people of Pakhtunistan, do hereby extend our heartiest gratitude to the people and the national government of our sister nation Afghanistan, who in this our grave trial and tribulation has in no niggardly fashion given us moral support.



There is no doubt whatsoever that our past assistance to Afghanistan in the hour of her need has won us a special place in the heart of every freedom-loving Afghan. Our sacrifice in men and material to fight our common enemy has not been in vain. Our defence of the rightful claims of our sister nation Afghanistan has no doubt won us the sympathies of the entire population of that country. The day is here. Now that we are in need of help, we turn to our Afghan brothers, who more than any other people in the world can appreciate our point of view. No sacrifice will be in vain, and we are certain that no sacrifice will be withheld from us. Our fight is for independence, an ideal very close to the heart of our Afghan brothers. So we beseech our Afghan brothers to stand shoulder to shoulder with us in this great struggle for liberty and justice.

“(6) *From Pakhtuns Abroad:*

We, the members of the Pakhtunistan National Assembly, cordially thank all the Pakhtuns living in Asia, America, Europe, Africa and Australia. We know that our voice has not only reach you in the far corners of the earth, but it has echoed back straight from your hearts. We thank you for your material as well as spiritual assistance. We have unshakable faith in your unswerving loyalty to the cause of liberty, wherever it may be. Raise your voices against the forces of oppression and continue your moral and material assistance for a cause worthy of your sacrifice.

“(7) *From all Muslim Nations:*

History is an unbiassed witness to the noble deeds and heroic contribution of Pakhtuns in spreading the light of Islam over a vast area. Our contribution to the cause of Islam will be remembered for as long as our sacred religion brightens the dark corners of this troubled world with the light of truth and justice. Our people have willingly fought in defence of other Muslim countries whenever their liberty has been jeopardised. We have always fought side by side with our Muslim brothers in defence of Islam for liberty. All these monumental sacrifices have been possible under the banner of freedom and independence. Our sole desire is the happiness of our Muslim brothers and of all Muslim nations. We have unshak-

able faith in Muslim brotherhood and firmly believe that our Muslim brothers all over the world sympathise with our cause and will not hesitate to give us a helping hand in achieving our cherished goal. Thus the desire to live in a Muslim family of nations on the basis of equality and justice would be fulfilled, and our contribution to the cause of Islam and freedom would be rendered easy.

“(8) *From the United Nations Organisation:*

Our contribution to the world culture and civilisation has been great enough to render enumeration superfluous. History has witnessed repeated examples of our struggle for peace, justice and progress. We want independence and we die to get it. Hence it is our urgent request to the United Nations Organisation and to all the peace-loving peoples of the world to see to it that no power attempts to enslave our freedom-loving people.

We request the United Nations Organisation and peace-loving nations to render us all possible assistance in achieving the independence which is the inalienable right of all people, and we consider ourselves worthy of it on the basis of our own history and desire as well as by virtue of the United Nations' Charter. We assure the peace-loving peoples of the world and also the United Nations Organisation that as an independent nation we are ready to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world; a dissatisfied Pakhtun nation, on the other hand, must devote all its energies to achieve her rightful desire of independence. It should also be taken into consideration that in this world of ours the plight of one nation affects the welfare of all peoples, and that any unrest in this part of the globe will have repercussions all over the world. Thus the peace and prosperity of the entire world will be affected if our right to freedom and justice is jeopardised.

“For Humanity is one and single,  
In Essence born of one Spring,  
When Time disturbs the happiness of one,  
The rest cannot untouched remain.”

The All India Pakhtun Conference held in Delhi on the 16th and 17th December will go down in the annals of the history of Pakhtunistan.

The Conference rightly warned the United Nations that if no just and speedy solution to this problem is found, the world may be faced with another Korean situation in Pakhtunistan. The Pakhtuns have been shouting that by adopting an imperialistic policy towards them, Pakistan is endangering world peace and that if she is allowed to follow this course unchecked they will be forced to answer one blow with two. The resolution containing this warning further draws the attention of the U.N. to the continued incarceration of the two Khan brothers and of 12,000 other Pakhtun political prisoners, who have been lying for the last three years in Pakistan prisons without trial.

The second resolution passed at the All India Pakhtun Conference openly challenges the Prime Minister of Pakistan to hold a referendum on the issue of Pakhtunistan versus Pakistan. The Pakistan Prime Minister has of late been making tall claims as to the popularity of his Government among the Pakhtuns and has repeatedly declared that they are solidly behind him.

In another resolution the Conference requested the Governments of India and Afghanistan to recognize the Azad Pakhtunistan Government presided over by the Mirza Ali Khan, and to establish diplomatic relations with it. This Government was established in 1949 with Gurwaik as its centre. It has its own army, which has in recent months been fighting Pakistan aggression, dealing many crushing blows.

The last important resolution passed at the Conference refers to the agreements affecting the Pakhtun people made by the Pakistan Government with foreign powers. When the Pakhtuns are a separate nation with their own Government, then Pakistan is not in any way authorised to speak on their behalf and has absolutely no claim to what belongs to them.

# CONCLUSION

Before the partition of India the British ruled over Indian-Muslims and Indian-Hindus alike, the two prominent communities in that country. The third important community under British influence and protection were the non-Indian Muslims or Pakhtuns, whose land both historically and geographically is a part of central Asia.

After partition the Indian-Muslims and Indian-Hindus were granted their independence and the sub-continent was divided into the two distinct states of India and Pakistan. The non-Indian Muslims, i.e., the Pakhtuns or Afghans on the western banks of the Indus were less fortunate; their legitimate right to independence was ignored and they were transferred, solely on the basis of religion, from the British yoke to that of the newly-established state of Pakistan.

Unfortunately this fact was not recognized at the time of the partition of India. A policy was adopted which had already been put to the test by the British Government and which, having proved unsuccessful, had led to the separation of the non-Indian territory from the Indian territories in the Punjab and the recognition of the Pakhtun territory as a land apart with different people from those in India. The repetition of this mistake was responsible for the opposition of the Pakhtuns to the Pakistan Government and the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan which has caused the present anxiety and restlessness on the Afghan border.

Afghanistan has no aggressive intentions whatsoever towards Pakistan; on the contrary, her intentions are to promote more friendly and closer relations with that country.

What Afghanistan desires is a distinct identity and political independence for all the Pakhtuns living between the so-called



Durand Line and the River Indus. She had time and again requested the British Government before the partition of India and again at the time of the division that the Pakhtuns or Afghans who were severed from Afghanistan by force for the defence of the British Empire in India, should be considered as a part neither of India nor of Pakistan. She also asked that these people should be given the opportunity of self-assertion in this particular connection. It was made quite clear to Great Britain several years before her departure from India that those Pakhtuns, being a separate entity, have the same right to enjoy their freedom as their Indian brothers. The Pakhtuns are more distinct from the people of the Indian sub-continent than the Burmese and the Ceylonese.

At the time when India and Pakistan obtained their independence the same was unfortunately not accorded to the Pakhtuns as their due right. The Afghan Government protested against this decision as a violation of Human Rights.

Meanwhile Mr. Jinnah, in two public statements, had openly recognized the independence of the Pakhtuns.

The outcome of the referendum held in 1947 which was enforced at the point of the bayonet was unsuccessful as almost half of the population voted for an independent Pakhtunistan, the voting being 50·1 per cent to 50·2 per cent in favour of accession to Pakistan. The Afghan Government did not consider this a sufficient majority to determine the destiny of a nation, but it was unfortunately taken as a decisive majority by Pakistan in spite of the fact that one of the most powerful political parties in the N.W.F.P. had not participated at all in the referendum. It was not only the Government of Afghanistan and the people of the N.W.F.P. who protested against this forced referendum but the people in the so-called Tribal Areas also became agitated and sent many delegations to the Afghan Government expressing their desire for accession to Afghanistan and seeking military assistance for the defence of the freedom of all Pakhtuns. Afghanistan assured them that she would try her best to persuade the Pakistan Government through diplomatic channels to recognize their distinct identity and to give full freedom to the Pakhtuns of the N.W.F.P., Baluchistan and the Tribal Areas.

During the negotiations with Pakistan both in Karachi and Kabul, the Afghan Government asked Pakistan to grant and recognize the distinct State of Pakhtunistan which the Pakhtuns had demanded. The Pakistan Government promised to consider this matter, but instead of keeping this promise, ruthlessly suppressed the national element in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan and an economic blockade of the independent tribes was imposed by the very unpopular government of the N.W.F.P.

Pakistan was not aware that her policy would create hostile feelings amongst all Pakhtuns living between the Durand Line and the River Indus and that her colonial policy would create unnecessary obstacles to her friendly relations with Afghanistan.

Since the beginning of 1949 the tribal people have on many occasions sent representatives to seek the help and assistance of the Government and people of Afghanistan in the cause of their freedom. In view of these circumstances the Afghan Government was compelled to show their dissatisfaction with the policy of Pakistan.

Disappointed by the outcome of peaceful diplomatic negotiations, it is feared that the people of the Tribal Area will take to arms, making it extremely difficult for Pakistan, as well as for Afghanistan, to tide over the situation. This is what the Afghan Government in her own interest as well as in that of world peace, is sincerely trying to avoid, because the clash of arms between Pakistan and the Tribal Area is sure to arouse the indignation of the entire population of Afghanistan and to affect the peace of the whole region by making almost impossible the Afghan Government's task of administration. Unfortunately ugly incidents have already occurred in the Mohmand area near Warsak, Waziristan and Baluchistan.

These facts, together with the imprisonment of the political leaders of the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, and the demonstrations of all Pakhtuns outside Pakhtunistan both in America and in India (Calcutta, Bombay and Delhi) for the establishment of a free Government of Pakhtunistan should open the eyes of Pakistan. It is very naive of Pakistan to plead in the 20th century for the maintenance of the status quo to dominate over the Pakhtun nation

against the will of the people and contrary to all international conventions of human rights.

There is at present no treaty in existence between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Anglo-Afghan treaty is now null and void since one party to the agreement — the British Government in India — has ceased to exist as an international entity. But with all this, the Afghan Government has never discontinued her peaceful policy and has refrained from taking any unilateral action in the matter.

Afghanistan has repeatedly declared and declares again that she desires no sort of authority over her Pakhtun kinsmen in the N.W.F.P., in the Tribal Area, or in Baluchistan. She wants only to see them a free nation according to the Charter of the United Nations. These views have been stated officially by the Afghan Government in Kabul, and Afghan representatives abroad.

The Agreements which led to the establishment of the Durand Line, and notably the treaty of 1921, created in the territory now claimed by the people of Pakhtunistan a territorial situation and imposed a political and military servitude which was designed to serve the interests of the British Empire and to ensure the security of her colonial power in the Indian sub-continent.

The authority thus imposed was in the general interests of the authorities concerned and was not effective in any local sense and was, therefore, not of such a character as to render it either permanent or transferable.

Pakistan cannot inherit rights established by agreements with Great Britain, because Pakistan was not the inheritor of any titular status, but was self constituted following the partition of India; this partition did not and cannot confer upon Pakistan rights of sovereignty over territory occupied by the Afghans of Pakhtunistan for these reasons:

(1) India stops historically and geographically at the Indus River.

(2) The territory occupied by these peoples was never incorporated within the Dominion of India.

(3) That the peoples themselves are of a different race and language and culture.

(4) The fact that the North West Frontier district has never had a static character and this cannot be imposed upon it through

the agency of violent conquest from outside the territory.

(5) That the right of self determination is a fundamental right in all circumstances.

(6) As stated in the Atlantic Charter and confirmed by the Charter of the United Nations:

- (a) The desire to recognise no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.
- (b) The respect for the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live; and the wish to recognise the sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

Secession does not render the agreements pertaining to a dismembered State liable to be transferred to a newly constituted State.

In addition, it is impossible to regard the territorial situation which was created by these said agreements as a permanent one when it is understood that the circumstances in which they were drawn up have completely changed. The end in view when these agreements were made has disappeared since Great Britain has withdrawn from the sub-continent and has left to the two Dominions concerned the responsibility for the guarding of their security.

Even if the need for the protection of the Indian Dominions continues to be a vital issue, that is not to say that the surrender into the hands of Pakistan of the defence of the strategic passes is necessarily the procedure to be employed, nor that by this means the object in view would be attained.

From the legal point of view the Anglo-Afghan treaties, even if it is maintained that they still hold good cannot be modified in any degree unilaterally but only by the constitution of new agreements between the Governments and the interested parties, that is to say, the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the representatives of the Afghan population of the disputed territories. Failing this Afghanistan is justified both morally and legally in availing herself of Article 14 of the Treaty of 1921 to reject entirely the stipulations relating to Pakhtunistan territory, and in particular, the independent tribal area.



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